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Abstract
Humans leverage material forms for unique cognitive purposes: We recruit and incorporate them into our cognitive sys-
tem, exploit them to accumulate and distribute cognitive effort, and use them to recreate phenotypic change in new indi-
viduals and generations. These purposes are exemplified by writing, a relatively recent tool that has become highly adept
at eliciting specific psychological and behavioral responses in its users, capability it achieved by changing in ways that facili-
tated, accumulated, and distributed incremental behavioral and psychological change between individuals and genera-
tions. Writing is described here as a self-organizing system whose design features reflect points of maximal usefulness
that emerged under sustained collective use of the tool. Such self-organization may hold insights applicable to human
cognitive evolution and tool use more generally. Accordingly, this article examines the emergence of the ability to lever-
age material forms for cognitive purposes, using the tool-using behaviors and lithic technologies of ancestral species and
contemporary non-human primates as proxies for matters like collective use, generational sustainment, and the non-
teleological emergence of design features.
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1. Introduction
What differentiates human cognition from that of every
other species? As neuroscientist Christof Koch recently
observed, there is ‘‘no simple brain-centric explanation’’
for our putative cognitive supremacy—not the size of
our brain, nor the number or type of its neurons
(Koch, 2019). Some clues may be found in the traits
distinguishing it among the brains of living and ances-
tral primates: Its shape is rounder, a change called glo-
bularization that has implications for intra- and inter-
regional connectivity (Azevedo et al., 2009; K. R.
Gibson, 1991; Kaas, 2000; Rilling & Insel, 1999). The
proportionality of its lobes is also distinctive, especially
in its relatively large parietal area, a region associated
with both globularization (Bruner, 2004, 2010; Bruner
et al., 2003, 2011; Bruner & Iriki, 2016) and tool use
(Orban & Caruana, 2014; Orban et al., 2006).
Koch’s phrasing implies any potential explanations
will be neither simple nor brain-centric, and certainly,
our parietal structure and function suggest our cogni-
tive differences might well be related to our use of
tools. Non-human species also use tools, but both their
tools and tool use differ qualitatively and quantitatively
from ours. We often assume we have better tools
because we have better brains. Here, the equation is
reversed to suggest we have different brains because we
have become able to leverage material forms for cogni-
tive purposes: We recruit and incorporate them into
our cognitive system (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), exploit
them to accumulate and distribute cognitive effort
between individuals and generations (Hutchins, 1995),
and use them to recreate phenotypic change in new
individuals and generations.
Such cognitive purposes may sound farfetched or
more than a bit Lamarckian, so an example will be
helpful: Consider reading, a cognitive state that does
not exist—indeed, cannot exist—without interacting
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with a specific material form, writing. As a material
form, writing is an excellent example of a material form
integral to cognition, even if the particular cognitive
state and its material incorporation exist only so long
as someone reads. Writing is also a tool that has
become adept at eliciting specific behavioral and psy-
chological changes in its users (Overmann, 2016,
2017). We call these changes ‘‘literacy’’ and the pro-
cess of acquiring them ‘‘learning to read and write,’’
terms showing we either ignore or take for granted
the material form’s contribution and how its capacity
to make that contribution developed and refined over
time.
Essentially, literacy consists of a suite of beha-
vioral and psychological changes acquired through
sustained interaction with a particular material form.
When someone learns to read and write, the temporal
gyrus becomes trained to recognize written objects
topologically (Figure 1) and associate them with lan-
guage functions and the motor movements of hand-
writing (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007, 2011; Nakamura et
al., 2012; Perfetti & Tan, 2013; Roux et al., 2009;
Tremblay & Dick, 2016). Hands become proficient at
making the fine motor movements that produce writ-
ten marks, and coordination between the hands and
eyes improves, as do recognition and recall functions,
lexical retrieval, and tolerance for ambiguity in how
characters are formed (Giovanni, 1994; James &
Engelhardt, 2012; Longcamp et al., 2005; Roux et al.,
2009; Su¨lzenbru¨ck et al., 2011). These changes in
functionality and the brain regions implicated in them
appear relatively consistent between individuals and
across differences in culture, language, character
form, and whether writing maps to words, syllables,
or sounds (Bolger et al., 2005; Carreiras et al., 2007,
2009; Frost, 2012).
If today that material form seems static, it has none-
theless changed greatly when considered over time. A
little over 5000 years ago in the ancient Near East,
writing began as small pictures and signs that were
meaningful in virtue of resemblances and conventions
(Figure 2). As brains became trained to recognize these
pictures and signs topologically, the need to resemble
the original objects or conventions was relaxed. As
depictiveness was lost, the set of characters became less
variable overall but reorganized within the remaining
variability in ways that emphasized the features that
Figure 1. Topological recognition of objects. (Left) A cube is
apparent in the combination of local details (circles and cutouts)
and global cues (relations between local details). (Right) The
words ‘‘the cat’’ are recognizable, although the middle
characters are neither H nor A. Meaning is derived from the
letters themselves, their contexts within words, and associations
with the mental lexicon for language acquired when learning to
read and write. Image created by the author. Earlier versions
were published in Overmann (2016, p. 288, Figure 2(A); 2019,
Figure 10.7, p. 190).
Figure 2. Chronology of sign forms in Mesopotamian writing. Writing began around 3200 BCE as small pictures and signs that were
meaningful through resemblance and convention (these early signs were rotated 90 counterclockwise here to facilitate their
comparison with later signs). By 2500 BCE, characters were noticeably less depictive of whatever they had initially resembled, and as
a set, they were much more alike to one another than the earlier pictures had been, so that individuating and distinguishing them
entailed learning and practice (as can be seen in Figure 3 with the emergence of an increasingly structured curriculum). Redrawn from
Nissen et al. (1993, p. 111, Figure 88). Earlier versions were published in Overmann (2016, p. 289, Figure 3; 2019, Figure 10.6, p. 188).
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individuated and distinguished them. Features are the
parts or characteristics of an object used to identify it
as itself (individuating) or tell it apart from other
objects of the same type (distinguishing). Features are
both aspects of capacity, form, and employment that
make objects useful as tools and co-occurring percep-
tual, motor, ergonomic, and functional experiences that
form the basis of categories and prototypes of tools
(Barsalou, 2008; Malafouris, 2013; Overmann &
Wynn, 2019a).
This intensification of features was partly an effect
of familiarity. When we are familiar with a set of
objects, the individuating and distinguishing features
can be subtle, but using subtle clues requires learning
and practice (for a discussion of how brains change
through experience, see Kelly & Garavan, 2005).
Conversely, when we are unfamiliar with a set of
objects, the individuating and distinguishing features
must be more overt, and there is correspondingly less
need for learning and practice. This same effect is seen
in the recognition of facial features, where familiarity
permits more fine-grained distinctions of increasingly
subtle clues. Unfamiliarity, in comparison, means that
things differentiated by subtle clues are more difficult
to individuate and distinguish, an effect found in cross-
race eyewitness identifications (Brigham et al., 2007).
Feature intensification was also an effect of use and
usability. That is, aspects of the objects being used as
tools intensified through use, becoming pronounced in
ways that made them even more useful. These were
‘‘design’’ features (Gowlett, 2006) but not ‘‘designed’’
features: What they were as features and how they
changed over time did not reflect a guiding teleology
per se, but rather, use of the object as a tool by a partic-
ular species for a specific purpose. Further, while inven-
tion and intent to modify the tool or solve particular
problems were undoubtedly part of the process, this
was likely a minor aspect of the set of changes, espe-
cially those related to the reorganization of the visual
appearance of the material form. Most participants
merely used the tool, and in the process contributed
variability—slight differences and new combinations of
behavioral, physiological, psychological, and material
capacities and qualities—that collectively influenced
features to converge on usability maximized for the
human average.
Changes in psychological processing enabled further
change in both behaviors and tool form. An example is
cursive, a form of writing characterized by the use of
‘‘abbreviated signs, crowded writing, and unclear sign
boundaries’’ that emerged around 2000 BCE (Veldhuis,
2011, p. 72). Cursive traded clarity of form for speed of
production. This exchange would have been enabled by
the development of a tolerance for ambiguity in how
characters were formed, something associated with
writing by hand. Educators fear this tolerance will be
lost as handwriting is replaced by production modalities
like typing (Konnikova, 2014), though it is also true
such automated production is typically accompanied by
highly standardized displays (e.g. computer fonts) that
mitigate the need for tolerance by reducing ambiguity
below the threshold of perceptibility. Another example
is the level of character detail, which decreased after
2000 BCE. In modern scripts, detailed characters are
easier for novices to recognize but tend to slow profi-
cient readers, who need less detail, because they are able
to make greater use of global cues (Bird, 1998, 1999;
Ravid & Haimowitz, 2006). In modern cases (e.g. dia-
critics marking tone in African languages or vowels in
Hebrew), it has been possible to develop different script
forms, a more detailed version for learners and a less
detailed version for masters, the trade-off being the
need to learn both script forms. For ancient scripts, a
balance of detail—enough for learners, not too much
for masters—appears to have been achieved in a single
script form, the trade-off being a suboptimum level of
detail for both groups.
In the reorganization toward literacy, another
change occurred in productive behavior, which became
habitual and then automated. This is discerned as the
standardization of the order in which the strokes of the
characters were produced, something that is recover-
able because of the way clay surfaces retain marks
made in succession: continuous furrows were produced
later than ones they cross and interrupt (Bramanti,
2015; Taylor, 2015). Automaticity would have freed
cognitive resources like attention and working memory,
enabling writers to focus on the content of their writing
rather than the mechanics of its production. This same
effect is noticeable when someone learns to drive a car:
Novices must closely attend to road conditions and the
mechanics of accelerating, steering, and braking, but
proficient drivers need to attend less to such things,
becoming alert only when something changes (Charlton
& Starkey, 2011). This leaves proficient drivers free to
attend to other matters consistent with safely operating
a vehicle, like thinking, conversing, and listening to
music. In ancient writing, this transformed writing from
a tool that recorded mental content to one allowing its
users to engage that content more directly, facilitating
the ‘‘revolution in writing [that] took place around 2000
BCE’’ (Veldhuis, 2012, p. 3), the dramatic expansion of
applications and topics to which writing was applied.
Topological recognition; tolerance for ambiguity;
greater use of global cues; productive standardization,
automaticity, and speed; and the recapitalization of
freed cognitive resources are only some of the many
behavioral and psychological developments that
enabled the material form of writing to lose its depic-
tiveness, detail, and clarity and intensify its useful fea-
tures (Figure 3). This systemic change appears to have
yielded literacy, or something analogous to the state we
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designate with the term, in Mesopotamia more than a
thousand years after writing was invented there
(Overmann, 2016). During its first millennium of use,
the material form changed incrementally through the
participation and behavioral–psychological reorganiza-
tion of succeeding generations of writers. Yet each new
generation only needed to learn to read and write using
whatever form the characters happened to take at the
time.
In learning to read and write, writers acquired the
specific behavioral and psychological reorganizations
associated with recognizing and producing particular
written forms, in the process changing those forms
slightly, until at some point writing had changed to an
extent it could no longer be read without training. As
shown in Figure 2, the earliest written forms, which
date to approximately 3200 BCE, are fairly easy to
individuate and distinguish; those from 2500 BCE and
thereafter are more difficult. In the course of adapting
behaviorally and psychologically to the tool, each gen-
eration of writers became able to use it and influence its
use and form. Crucially, the form itself—the set of writ-
ten characters—was malleable enough to change in
response to new behaviors and psychological states.
This iterative process of change through sustained inter-
action is how the material form was able to facilitate,
accumulate, and distribute incremental behavioral and
psychological change.
2. Applying insights from a self-organizing
system to stone tools
As just described, writing is a self-organizing system,
one in which points of maximal usefulness emerge from
Figure 3. The development of literacy from writing. The data on Mesopotamian writing were sorted into seven categories:
lexicography, dictionary-like compilations of words; organization, the layout of words on writing surfaces; syntax, how characters,
words, and phrases were arranged to reflect language; orthography, conventionalizations of signs and sign combinations; applications,
the purposes for which writing was used; curriculum, the systemization of training; and language, the degree to which writing
expressed language. The data show dramatic change in Mesopotamian writing, especially prior to 2000 BCE, the point at which
literacy is suggested by the emergence of several new characteristics, including (in orthography) a fairly standardized way to write
characters, words no longer being split between lines, and the emergence of a cursive script; (in applications) widespread use and
experimentation with writing; and (in curriculum) structured training (Overmann, 2016, 2019). Graph created by the author. Earlier
versions were published in Overmann (2016, p. 297, Figure 9; 2019, Figure 10.8, p. 195).
Source: The data were sourced from Bramanti (2015), Cooper (1996, 2004), Englund (1998), Hyman (2006), Krispijn (2012), Schmandt-Besserat
(1992), Taylor (2011, 2015), and Veldhuis (2011, 2012, 2014).
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a set of local, individual practices and interactions,
under conditions of sustained, communal use. As such
self-organization may hold insights applicable to
human cognitive evolution and tool use more generally,
these insights from writing are applied to stone tools,
with the goal of understanding how the ability to lever-
age material forms for cognitive purposes might have
emerged. (Readers interested in illustrations of stone
tools might consult the article by Wynn, in press.)
Writing and stone tools obviously differ substan-
tially in terms of their forms and functions. However,
several of these differences are worth examining for
what they imply about the systemic self-organization of
useful features through sustained, communal use.
Written characters are produced and used together—in
parallel—comprising sets. For the behavioral and psy-
chological reorganizations of literacy to occur, written
characters must also be produced with a relatively high
rate of frequency. Stone tools, in comparison, tend to
be produced and used individually, and at a lower repe-
tition frequency. Simply, it is possible to write dozens
of characters per minute, but it takes a more than a few
minutes to produce a stone tool. Further, writing pre-
supposes the close association of multiple characters in
a visually appreciable space, something that is not true
of stone tools. Parallel, highly repeated production and
use would have let the useful features of written charac-
ters become defined against one another, such that
writing would become a system of contrastive graphic
elements within millennia. Less frequent, individual
production and use, by comparison, would have meant
stone tools were less likely to be employed or placed
together for direct comparison. This would have neces-
sitated a greater reliance on memory as the bridge
between tool instances and employments, with the
result that the features of stone tools would likely have
been slower to self-organize systemically, relative to
writing.
Written features are also primarily visual, with an
important but secondary haptic component related to
their production by hand. While the active manipula-
tion of the material form of writing was essential to the
systemic change that would yield literacy, not all indi-
viduals who participated in the system would have
necessarily interacted with the tool physically them-
selves. This is true today of literate individuals with
impaired mobility, and it presumably would have been
possible in ancient times as well, given the requisite con-
ditions of opportunity and support. In comparison, the
features of stone tools—things like mass, weight, exten-
sion, thickness, skewness, and symmetry (Gowlett,
2006)—are largely haptic and ergonomic. Simply, heft
and balance are difficult to discern visually but rela-
tively easy to appreciate by handling and employing the
tool. Further, ontogenetic changes related to haptic
and ergonomic properties like heft and balance require
physical engagement of the tool; they are unlikely to be
acquired through visual interaction alone. They require
active manual engagement of the tool in a way that is
distinct from writing.
The different emphasis on visual and haptic percep-
tual modalities has implications for the conditions
under which tool features might emerge and intensify,
particularly in ancestral species lacking language.
Writing capable of engendering literacy necessarily
involves language, while stone tools began taking shape
more than a million years earlier than language is
thought to have developed, by any account of language
origins (regardless of whether some of its anatomic and
neural precursors were in place or concomitantly emer-
ging). Because the emergence of pronounced stone tool
features preceded language and haptic features are diffi-
cult to acquire visually, features of stone tools are
unlikely to have been transmitted or acquired through
observation or explanation. Rather, features more felt
than seen would have been acquired and transmitted by
handling the material forms themselves. Thus, for fea-
tures of tools that are not visually appreciable nor lin-
guistically explainable, acquisition implies repeated use,
and transmission implies shared use. That is, tools must
be handled more than once, and over a sufficient dura-
tion of time, for any individual to become familiar with
haptic features in the absence of language. Similarly,
transmitting the knowledge of haptic features between
individuals in the absence of language implies that the
same tool is being shared.
Another point to consider is the mechanism of
change. For writing, the mechanism proposed to
explain how and why our brains learn to recognize
written objects topologically is known as neuronal recy-
cling (Cohen & Dehaene, 2004; Dehaene & Cohen,
2007, 2011). Cortical areas with evolutionarily provided
functions, like the fusiform gyrus and its functionality
for recognizing physical objects, are thought to have
enough plasticity that they can also respond to cultural
stimuli like written marks. This, however, might not be
the ideal approach for investigating diachronic change,
for several reasons. First, the neuronal recycling
hypothesis focuses on the brain’s response to contem-
porary written forms; it does not consider how and
why the material form developed and over time refined
its capacity to evoke specific behavioral and psycholo-
gical responses in its users, or how it organized systemi-
cally as a system of contrastive elements. Second,
neuronal recycling assumes the plasticity typical in con-
temporary human brains. Plasticity is an evolutionary
trait associated with larger brains and concomitant
altriciality (Zeveloff & Boyce, 1982). Neolithic brains
demonstrated similar levels of plasticity in responding
to ancient writing and influencing change in its form.
Change in stone tools from the simple flakes found
before two million years to the bilateral symmetry,
compounding, and miniaturization that emerged after
two million years suggests ancestral brains were also
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plastic, though the slow pace of technological change
also argues they may have been less plastic than con-
temporary human brains.
Third, neuronal recycling is the kind of neurocentric
mechanism assumed in standard accounts of cognitive
evolution, wherein mind is conceived as a complex of
‘‘fixed and biologically determined capacities and
genetically pre-specified inherited structures whose ori-
gins can be explained by appeal to some fortuitous
mutations’’ (Malafouris, 2015, p. 358), with the archeo-
logical record serving principally to attest to its prod-
ucts and the timing of events. When the brain is
positioned as the primary cause, the questions of how
and why brains become capable of inventing tools that
are more complex are either left unanswered or dis-
missed by appealing to genetic or environmental fac-
tors. There is no doubt that things like mutation,
genetic drift, climate change, and resource availability
have influenced hominin cognitive evolution. However,
when the brain is positioned as the primary cause, the
tool becomes a passive object, one that merely reflects
the brain’s developing power and glory. Further, the
idea that perceptual and motor aspects of tools and
tool use engaged and enhanced neurological processes
like neuronal recycling does not explain how this would
have started or why it became pronounced in the
human lineage: Presumably, tools that are more com-
plex have a greater potential for influencing neurologi-
cal change, but if tool complexity is the mechanism for
neurological change and neurological change is what
enables tool complexity, how and why the process
started in the first place remain a mystery.
If not the brain, then tool-using behavior and the
tools themselves seem like a reasonable alternative
from which to start, since many species use tools.
That is, we assume ancestral tool use resembled the
tool-using behaviors observed today in contemporary
non-human species. We also assume that tools are con-
stitutive of cognition (Malafouris, 2013), not just in
humans but in all species that use tools. Our goal
remains the same: investigate how our hominin ances-
tors invented tools that were more complex and capa-
ble and had the potential to influence ontogenetic and
phylogenetic change. Assuming tools to be an integral
component of cognition lets us reverse the better-
brains-make-better-tools relation to ask whether and
under what conditions the kind of tool-using behaviors
seen in contemporary non-human species might influ-
ence material change, with material change ultimately
nudging the trajectory of cognitive evolution toward a
selection biased by behaviors with material forms.
The idea that behavior can bias selection is known
as Baldwinian selection. The idea is that ‘‘under some
conditions, learned behaviors can affect the direction
and rate of evolutionary change by natural selection’’
(Depew, 2003, p. 3). Applying Baldwin’s model, exist-
ing capacities for learning and plasticity are assumed to
underpin the acquisition of behaviors like using tools
to extract food resources. Here, we must consider what
the material component contributes. The material com-
ponent can influence behaviors toward becoming
shared and sustained. Under the condition of shared,
sustained use, the material form can itself change in
ways that influence subsequent change in the behaviors
and psychological processing of new users, as was seen
in the discussion of writing and literacy. This modest
but plausible start will let us examine how material
affordances might foster common use, sustain beha-
viors intergenerationally, increase familiarity and auto-
maticity, and intensify tool features toward greater
usefulness, resulting in tools that accumulate and distri-
bute cognitive effort between individuals and
generations.
It is important to emphasize that the behavioral and
psychological changes comprising literacy are not
genetic, though they draw upon genetically endowed
capacities and capabilities and—if they made a selec-
tively visible difference in the phenotype and were given
sufficient time—might influence how selective forces
act on them. Rather, literacy is ontogenetic, a suite of
behavioral and psychological changes acquired anew
by each participating individual. Anyone denied the
opportunity to engage the material form of writing in a
sustained fashion remains illiterate; most individuals
given the opportunity to engage the material form with
sufficient repetition become literate, at any time of life.
Such acquired change depends on two things. The
first is a material form used as a tool, one whose sub-
stance is malleable enough to change through use in
ways reflecting its employment. Using the tool must
also affect behavior and psychological processing, per-
haps merely as simple a matter as becoming familiar
with the tool’s visual, haptic, and ergonomic properties
and acquiring skill and automaticity in performing the
motor movements associated with using the tool.
Familiarity, skill, and automaticity imply sustained use,
employment that is repeated over whatever period of
time is sufficient to change behaviorally and psycholo-
gically. Sustained use also increases the likelihood the
material form will change in ways reflecting its employ-
ment, making its useful features more pronounced.
If material, behavioral, and psychological change
are to occur in more than a single user, the second
thing required is a social group, one in which multiple
individuals use the same material form in ways that
exceed merely witnessing the tool being used by others
or its discarded form. Over time, collective use of the
tool has the potential to influence material features
toward points of usability maximized for average beha-
vioral, physiological, and psychological capacities and
tool employments.
As used here, the term sustained means that the same
material form, perhaps but not necessarily the identical
tool itself, is used (‘‘retained’’) with sufficient repetition
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to develop familiarity and skill, or it is not (‘‘ad hoc’’).
The term collective means that the same material form,
perhaps but not necessarily the identical tool itself, is
employed by one (‘‘individual’’) or more (‘‘communal’’)
users. Communal use implies social transmission of
some sort (e.g. observation and emulation or imitation)
but not necessarily language. These characteristics,
when conjoined, form the spectrum of use and involve-
ment shown in Table 1.
As listed in the table, one end of the spectrum is ad
hoc: the single use of a single tool by a single individ-
ual. This is characteristic of chimpanzee termite fishing
(Sanz & Morgan, 2011; Stewart & Piel, 2014).
Individuals see others creating and using the tools or
their discarded forms, and they later create and experi-
ment with their own tools. Behaviors are socially
learned, and the individual proficiency required to
manipulate the tool with effective precision develops
across and despite creating and employing a new tool
for most occasions of use. Ad hoc tools demonstrate
that a material form need not be used more than once
to be a tool. However, under this condition, the mate-
rial form’s capacity for changing in ways that reflect its
employment is negligible, limited to whatever occurs
during a single use as informed by the level of familiar-
ity and skill the user has gained from past employments
of similar tools. The material form’s capacity to distri-
bute cognitive effort is also constrained to what can be
imparted through modalities of social learning, like
observation and emulation.
At the other end of the spectrum, multiple copies of
the same tool are used with significant repetition by
many individuals across multiple generations, as in
writing (Overmann, 2016). Sustained, communal use
changes the material form in ways that reflect its
employment for a particular task, influencing its usable
features toward greater usability; in this way, the mate-
rial form accumulates cognitive effort. As users learn to
use the tool’s current form, they acquire any behavioral
and psychological changes that are needed for its
employment; in this way, the material form distributes
cognitive effort. Sustained, communal use also enables
the usable features of the tool, as they become pro-
nounced, to remain synchronized to average capacities.
Many factors contribute to this tool use, not just lan-
guage but the ability to imitate and over-imitate motor
movements (Whiten, McGuigan, et al., 2009).
The interesting cases are in the middle of the spec-
trum. Retained, individual tool use is exemplified by
early Homo, which is associated with the earliest
retouched stone tools, a characteristic implying the
tools were retained and reused (Coolidge & Wynn,
2018). Retained, communal tool use is illustrated with
the habitual use of hammer stones and anvils by con-
temporary non-human primates (Barrett et al., 2018;
Carvalho et al., 2009; McGrew, 2010). For both these
groups, tool use is assumed to be transmitted through
social means (e.g. observation of actions and results,
emulation and possibly imitation, and some ability to
switch between these strategies; see Horner & Whiten,
2005; Whiten, McGuigan, et al., 2009), but not lan-
guage, as well as underpinned by existing, genetically
endowed capacities for learning and plasticity.
A novel behavior associated with early Homo
appears in the archeological record at about two mil-
lion years ago: Stone tools are retouched, implying they
were retained and reused (Coolidge & Wynn, 2018).
Retention and reuse are consistent with both the reuse
of a tool by a single individual and the shared use of a
tool by a group. While there are currently no tech-
niques to distinguish which of these possibilities may
have been the case, both have been observed in contem-
porary non-human primates. Retention and reuse by a
single individual would have provided opportunities to
develop greater awareness of usable features like exten-
sion and thickness (Gowlett, 2006), while shared use of
the same tool might foster some level of common
awareness of usable features between individuals.
Reuse, whether by an individual or within a group,
along with the repetition it implies, also increases the
Table 1. Tool use by individuals and groups.
Category Tools Users Uses Example
Ad hoc/individual One One* One Chimpanzee termite fishing
Retained/individual One One** Many Early Homo tool retention/reuse
Retained/communal One Many Many Habitual use of stone tools in primates
Sustained/communal Many Many Many Writing
In ad hoc/individual use, a single individual creates and uses a single tool on a single occasion, as in chimpanzee termite fishing; *others may witness
an instance of use or view a discarded tool. In retained/individual use, a single individual creates and uses a single tool more than once or **uses a
tool previously used by another individual, noting these are archeologically indistinguishable. An example is tool use by early Homo, whose tools
show signs of reuse (Coolidge & Wynn, 2018). In retained/communal use, multiple individuals use a single tool multiple times; this behavior is seen in
contemporary non-human primates that habitually use a hammer and anvil to extract food. In sustained/communal use, many instances of the same
tool and tool type are used many times by multiple individuals cross-generationally; an example is writing. Of note, the organization of the table
neither assumes nor advocates a particular order of emergence.
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likelihood the material form will change in ways reflect-
ing its use, intensifying its useful features toward
greater usability.
Early Homo’s behavioral change—retaining, reus-
ing, and possibly sharing its tools—requires some con-
text: By the time this behavior is attested, stone tools
had already been in use for about a million and a half
years, given a date of 3.3 million years for the Pre-
Mode I flaked tools from Lomekwi 3 (Harmand et al.,
2015). It is also possible that early stone tool use has
been underestimated, perhaps significantly so, as stones
are likely to have also been used percussively, in addi-
tion to being used to produced flakes, and percussive
use is more difficult to detect archeologically. This pos-
sibility is suggested by the widespread use of stones for
percussive purposes by contemporary non-human pri-
mates. McGrew and colleagues (McGrew et al., 2019)
suggest the common denominator of stone tool use by
chimpanzees, capuchins, and macaques is the use of
hammers and anvils to extract nuts. While this activity
leaves archeologically detectible traces, these signatures
can be less overt than those involving flakes (Whiten et
al., 2009).
Retained, communal tool use, and possible insight
into the earliest stone tool use as well, may be gained
by examining the tool use of contemporary non-human
primates. Using stone hammers and anvils to extract
food has become habitual in a colony of Panamanian
capuchins (Barrett et al., 2018). The designation ‘‘habi-
tual’’ means the behavior has been observed repeatedly
in several individuals (Whiten et al., 1999). In this case,
the colony has used stone tools for more than 14 years
(the period of observation to the point of publication)
and greater than 80% of the days observed at the most
active site, with the behavior occurring year-round and
with more than half the identifiable individuals partici-
pating (Barrett et al., 2018). Barrett and colleagues
identified several conditions as contributing to the
behavioral habituation: The colony had limited access
to food resources, which necessitated the use of extrac-
tive tools to exploit foods encased in hard shells. The
species is also highly terrestrial, and the particular col-
ony lives under a reduced threat of predation, condi-
tions both permitting and opportunizing the use of
ground-based tools. Other conditions would likely have
contributed: Primates generally tend to be tool using
and highly social, and they have hands and arms suit-
able for grasping and wielding objects.
Monkeys, however, tend to guard rather than share
their tools (Michael Haslam, workshop comment, 9
Feb. 2018). If the key to sustained use of tools relates
to conditions of need, opportunity, and sociality, the
key to communal tool use may lie in their affordances.
As defined by psychologist James J. Gibson (1977,
1979), an affordance is a relation between the action-
able properties of a material form and the capacity of
an actor to exploit them. Here, the analysis focuses on
properties that attract or limit the use of stone tools. In
terms of attractants, hammers and anvils afford access
to critical resources, and the behavior can be trans-
mitted through existing capacities and mechanisms
(e.g. social learning). For limitations, anvils cannot be
removed or exclusionarily guarded. This necessitates
their being shared, often with one individual using and
others looking on. As was mentioned earlier, repeated,
shared use of the same tool affords some opportunity
to appreciate its intrinsic features, in common and
without language.
Habituation implies increased familiarity with the
tool, the opportunity to develop skill in employing it,
and the possibility the tool may change in ways reflect-
ing its use. Familiarity and skill may influence tool use
toward ergonomically adept ways of gripping and
wielding: those requiring less physiological force,
involving greater biomechanical comfort or grip secu-
rity, or producing a more effective outcome. Change in
the material form from repeated use, especially
repeated use informed by familiarity and skill, implies
an increased likelihood that tool features will intensify
in ways related to their usability. This in turn might
enhance the recognizability of internal features of
objects being used as tools—the properties making
them more grippable, wieldable, effortless, or
effective—constituting a mechanism for generating a
concept or category of tool, the idea being that a proto-
type is the association of co-occurring internal proper-
ties (Barsalou, 2008; Overmann & Wynn, 2019a; also
see Table 2).
Habituation and familiarity may have other effects.
Carvalho, McGrew, and colleagues (Carvalho et al.,
2009; McGrew, 2010) observed not just habitual but
preferential tool use by wild chimpanzees, wherein they
favored particular combinations of hammers and anvils
rather than individual stones. Preferential use has sev-
eral implications. First, the chimpanzees seem to be
recognizing the two elements as comprising a functional
whole. This too is categorizing, though the ability to
construe complementary functionality in multiple ele-
ments differs from the ability to recognize co-occurring
internal properties in objects (Table 2). The chimpan-
zees may also be making discriminations of tool effec-
tiveness (Carvalho et al., 2009; McGrew, 2010), likely
an effect of familiarity with multiple tools and tool
combinations. Carvalho, McGrew, and colleagues also
noted that repeated, preferential use of specific rocks
for percussion would amplify their use-wear, increasing
the likelihood they might fracture and create sharp,
usable flakes through battering.
If their hammer stone were to break, how might
habitual tool-using monkeys respond? Abandoning the
behavior likely would not be their first reaction, given
their capacities for memory and learning and the con-
tinuing conditions of resource scarcity and reduced pre-
dation. They might look for a replacement stone, since
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searching for resources falls within their behavioral
repertoire. They might recognize as suitable a replace-
ment with a similar look and feel to the original stone,
given their ability to recognize qualities like size, mass,
and hardness in raw materials (McGrew et al., 2019),
their ability to learn and recognize new objects, and the
familiarity, skill, and prototype availability implied by
habitual tool use. They might bring a replacement back
to use with the original anvil, given their habituation to
the site, or they might find and use a new anvil.
Behaving as they did before with replacement tools
means habit and learning must provide the continuity
across the change in material forms. Certainly, the pre-
ponderance of ‘‘might,’’ ‘‘maybe,’’ and ‘‘perhaps’’ in
this hypothetical chain of events is not inconsistent
with the slow and hesitant way ancestral tool use
appears to have started.
3. Conclusion
Intensification of the features of stones used as tools is
typically interpreted as users acquiring greater skill in
manufacturing techniques and investing greater effort
in making the usable features more pronounced. At
some point, this would undoubtedly have been the case,
but the intensification of the features of stone tool used
by early hominins might also be a matter of form emer-
ging as a byproduct of use (how form can emerge in
producing stone tool has been demonstrated experi-
mentally by Moore & Perston, 2016). Intensification
means more than simply the shape a core gradually
assumes as flakes are removed; it also means the emer-
gence of features like sharp edges and grips as matters
related to the functions and purposes to which the tool
is applied. In a way similar to that seen in the reorgani-
zation of writing toward literacy, effects of sustained,
collective use like habituation and familiarity would
begin to influence the features individuating and distin-
guishing stone tools toward greater definition and
usability. Similarly, automaticity of behaviors would
free cognitive resources like attention to notice aspects
of tool operation and employment, enabling these to
become more deliberate. Under sustained, collective
use, material forms malleable enough to change in ways
reflecting their use would begin to accumulate and dis-
tribute cognitive effort, thereby influencing behavioral
and psychological change between individuals and
generations.
Over evolutionary spans of time, the combined
effects of behavioral, psychological, and material change
might influence selection through the Baldwinian
mechanism previously noted. The forms such change
might take are suggested by unique aspects of human
brain form and function that appear related to our long
history of tool use. One example is found in the human
parietal cortex, a part of the brain particularly impli-
cated in tool use (Orban & Caruana, 2014): A change in
brain form with functional implications for categorizing
is our ability to discern and differentiate subtle, intrinsic
features of objects, known as detailed vision; this func-
tion, associated with the anterior portion of human
intraparietal sulcus (IPS), appears derived in hominids
since it lacks a homolog in monkey IPS (Choi et al.,
2006; Lewis & Van Essen, 2000; Orban & Caruana,
2014; Orban et al., 2006). And as Malafouris has noted
regarding the 2006 study by Orban et al.,
Of particular interest was the absence of recruitment of
prefrontal cortex (PFC) activations associated with strate-
gic action planning. These results suggest the possibility
that evolved parietofrontal circuits, enhancing sensorimo-
tor adaptation and affordance perception rather than
higher abstract level prefrontal action planning systems
and conceptualisations, were central to ESA [Early Stone
Age] technological evolution. (Malafouris, 2010, p. 57)
Malafouris contrasted these results with a later study
by Stout and colleagues (Stout et al., 2008), wherein
Table 2. Categorical judgments.
Judgment Definition Example Species
Identity Sameness or difference
between single elements
A = A; A 6¼ B. Humans; many other
species
Relations Sameness and difference
in multiple elements
AA and BB share the property of
having two identical elements
Humans; other great
apes, to a limited extent
Cross-dimensional
relations
Sameness and difference
in only some properties of
multiple elements
aaaaaaaa and BBB (identical
elements); aaaaaaaa and cde
(small size); “““ and cde (trios)
Only humans (that we
know of)
Human abilities for categorizing exceed those of other species, especially in our ability to ignore salient properties to focus on important but less
salient ones, judgments of cross-dimensional relations (Christie & Gentner, 2007; Gentner & Colhoun, 2010). The distribution of these abilities
suggests the ability to judge identity and simple relations is ancestral, while the ability to judge complex relations is derived in hominins, with human
complex hierarchical categorization a consequence of a long evolutionary history of engaging material forms in ways that enhanced familiarity with
and use of their internal features and external relations.
Source: Data drawn from Christie and Gentner (2007) and Gentner and Colhoun (2010).
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neural activity associated with Late Acheulean knap-
ping methods showed an increased PFC involvement,
relative to Oldowan knapping methods, implying the
former possibly demonstrated the ‘‘emergence of
higher-levels of intentional organization in flake
removal’’ (Malafouris, 2010, p. 57). Thus, our unique
abilities for categorizing (Table 2) may well relate to
our ability to discern and differentiate visually the
subtle, intrinsic features of objects used as tools, capa-
cities ultimately traceable to simple ancestral behaviors
with them.
As was mentioned in some detail, writing and stone
tools differ in many respects—not just the tools them-
selves and the species using them, but the particular
movements needed to use them, the parts of the brain
active during their use, and the purposes they support
as well. Connecting such different technologies through
their ontogenetic effects on familiarity, skill, and auto-
maticity will undoubtedly be challenging, and the level
of difficulty will only increase when we attempt to cor-
relate them to phylogenetic changes like detailed vision.
Yet when we consider the role of a material form like
writing, not just in recording information but in realiz-
ing a cognitive state like literacy, we find that tools
make minds (Malafouris, 2013), an evolutionary
mechanism involving material forms that does not
depend entirely on brains or appeal to genetic and envi-
ronmental causes. It may have explanatory power that
neurocentric accounts currently lack. The mechanism
may enable us to explore how, when, and why our
ancestors recruited and incorporated material forms
into their cognitive system, exploited them to accumu-
late and distribute cognitive effort, and recreated phe-
notypic change in new individuals and generations
through them, producing not just the human species as
it is today but the human species as it will be in the
future as it continues to respond cognitively to its tool
use.
It remains to be seen whether there are further
insights to be gained by considering stone tools—and
for that matter, other technologies—as systems whose
forms and features self-organize and intensify through
sustained, collective use. Forms and features of writing
like cursive, the trade-off in the level of detail for
novice and proficient users, and the criticality of man-
ual engagement may depend on capabilities that have
developed within the past several million years of mate-
rial engagement. These might include neural muscles
and neural fossils, neural activity related to planning
tool-using movements but not necessarily carrying
them out (Overmann & Wynn, 2019a, 2019b); an
example is the involvement of Exner’s area for hand-
writing in reading comprehension (Anderson et al.,
1990; Roux et al., 2009). If this is the case, the forms
and features of writing might not have direct parallels
in other technologies per se but may suggest instead the
possibility that similarly individualized effects emerge
from different combinations of brains, behaviors, tools,
and tool functions. Investigating this will require arche-
ologists, primatologists, flintknappers, and cognitive
scientists to adopt new ways of thinking, not only
about how meaning emerges through use (the semiotic
function Malafouris calls enactive signification), but
how form can emerge as well, through the relations
between usability, material properties, species capaci-
ties, and sustained, collective use.
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